There is an old legal maxim: "hard cases make bad law".
This maxim may at first sight perhaps be interpreted to mean that a harsh result for an individual that does not comply with societal expectations and ethical norms makes for bad law if indeed the law of the land has been correctly applied to the circumstances of that individual. However, if that was the thrust of the maxim, why not state the undoubted truth that bad law makes for hard cases?
I believe therefore that the preferred interpretation of this maxim is the contrary to that above and was meant to apply principally to English common law. It tells us that when judges stretch the meaning of normally clear words and phrases or impose an untenable gloss to avoid unwanted results, the law they create will be technically "bad". It will be "bad" because it is inconsistent with accepted legal principles, definitions, procedures and/or past decisions that should have been followed as they were laid down by a higher court. The judge may have tried to alter process or the legal definitions of words and phrases and muddied, obscured or confused the law as a consequence. Indeed, the term "bad law", when used by lawyers, is generally taken to mean that the "law" in question does not stand up to logical or academic forensic analysis and/or it is inconsistent with precedent or the process by which the result was reached is unjustified or inappropriate.
The multiple representative claims for damages against representative defendants in the case known as AB and Others v Leeds Teaching Hospital NHS Trust and Another (2004) The Times, April 12, arose from the scandal of retained organs removed from children at post-mortem without their parents' prior specific consent. Their parents claimed they had not been told that some of the organs removed and studied at post-mortem had never been replaced but had been retained for potential research.
In a reserved judgment, Gage J concluded that doctors could owe a duty of care to a mother after the death of her baby. For this reason, the (previously normal and routine) practice of not warning parents that a post-mortem examination might involve the removal and retention of an organ could not always be justified. However, where the claimants had no right of burial and possession of organs lawfully removed at post-mortem and retained, there was no action for wrongful interference with the body of the child. Much of the debate revolved around the wording and the meaning and effects of sections 1 and 2 of the Human Tissue Act 1961. This Act is due to be amended by Parliament to prevent a recurrence of what is often called the "Alder Hey organ scandal". However, key sections of the new Human Tissue Bill are due to be redrafted before its third reading in the House of Commons by way of response to the very serious and real concerns that have been expressed by eminent scientists, doctors, medical charities and institutions.
The Bill as currently drafted would outlaw the use of any human tissue, including blood and urine samples and cancer biopsies, for research or training, without explicit prior consent. Any doctor or scientist who failed to obtain this consent could face a prison sentence of up to three years and an unlimited fine. The Bill as drafted is totally impractical and wholly "over the top" and would impose a huge and terrible bureaucratic burden on the NHS and the private sector. Some 150 million tissue samples of this sort are taken each year in the course of medical procedures; the current Bill's requirements would place a crushing financial burden that would have the unwanted result of paralysing research.
Experts have lobbied the government who have been warned that if this legislation were enacted, certain lines of research would no longer be practical or carried out in Britain at all. Studies that identified new variant CJD and BRCA genes that are linked to breast cancer would not be possible under the new rules. It is to be hoped that the government will take heed of these warnings when the amendments are drawn up and the Bill goes back for its third reading.
The amendments sought would reclassify tissue that has been removed from a living patient as having "presumed consent" for use in research and training.
However, the new Bill will require that explicit consent is given in a patient's will or by the next of kin for tissue and whole organs to be removed postmortem. This is to ensure there will be no recurrence of the practices that led to the "Alder Hey organ scandal" at that Children's Hospital in Liverpool and at the Bristol Royal Infirmary.
It would be ironic and shocking if the hard cases that were allowed to result from the poorly drafted Human Tissue Act 1961 were used as a reason to create new bad law that will fetter, stifle and penalise important, valuable and much needed research in the UK in future.
